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Abstract
The legal relevance of the “urban refugee” concept in the
Middle East and Africa stems from the practice of practic-
ing different forms of refugee status determination (RSD)
in rural as opposed to urban areas. Urban refugees are
usually subject to rigorous individual adjudication, while
rural refugees are typically recognized on a prima facie
basis. This difference in procedure has no basis in the sub-
stance of refugee law, and it marginalizes urban refugees
in two key ways. First, in Africa and the Middle East, refu-
gee status recognition is used by host governments to pre-
vent refugee integration, to force refugees to live far from
population centres, and to transfer responsibility for their
welfare to international agencies. Second, individualized
RSD procedures in wide use by the United Nations gener-
ally lack key fairness safeguards, increasing the risk that
genuine refugees will be wrongfully rejected. This phe-
nomenon means that urban refugee populations will often
be systematically undercounted, and will include a signifi-
cant number of de facto refugees who are in fact refugees
in danger of refoulement, but whose applications were re-
jected and who thus have no access to the protection and
resources otherwise targeted at refugees.
Résumé
La pertinence juridique du concept de « réfugié urbain »
au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique provient de la pratique
d’appliquer différentes approches à la détermination du
statut de réfugié (DSR) pour ceux vivant en milieu rural
par opposition à ceux vivant en milieu urbain. Les réfu-
giés en milieu urbain sont généralement sujets à un ré-
gime juridique individuel sévère, tandis que ceux en
milieu rural sont typiquement admis sur une base prima
facie. Cette différence de procédure n'a aucun fondement
juridique dans la loi sur le statut des réfugiés, et mène à
l’exclusion des réfugiés urbains de deux manières fonda-
mentales. D'abord, en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient, la
procédure de détermination du statut de réfugié est utili-
sée par les gouvernements hôtes pour empêcher l'intégra-
tion des réfugiés, pour les forcer à vivre loin des
agglomérations, et pour transférer la responsabilité de
leur prise en charge sociale aux organismes internatio-
naux. En second lieu, les procédures individualisées de
DSR largement utilisées par les Nations Unies ne contien-
nent généralement pas toutes les sauvegardes essentielles
aux principes d’équité, augmentant ainsi le risque que de
vrais réfugiés soient rejetés à tort. Ce phénomène signifie
que les populations de réfugiés en milieu urbain seront le
plus souvent systématiquement sous dénombrées, et inclu-
ront un nombre important de réfugiés de fait qui sont en
réalité des réfugiés en danger de refoulement dont les ap-
plications ont été rejetées, et qui n’ont ainsi aucun accès à




nternational refugee law guarantees refugee rights re-
gardless of geography. Yet the law of refugee status is
implemented differently in different places, particularly
in terms of how a person obtains official recognition of
refugee status. In Europe and North America, refugees usu-
ally obtain formal recognition of their legal status by making
individual asylum applications to systems of administrative
adjudication. In the geopolitical South, the presumed norm
– at least in rural areas – has been for refugees to gain formal
recognition on a group basis, without individual assess-
ments.
Urban refugees in the South are subject to something more
anomalous and problematic. They generally must make in-
dividual refugee claims, like their counterparts in the North,
but these claims are decided through procedures that gener-
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ally lack critical safeguards of fairness developed in adminis-
trative law and United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) advice to governments. Whereas Northern
states normally have unitary national systems that determine
refugee status for anyone inside the country, African states
often maintain dual systems of status determination within
the same country, with different mechanisms in rural and
urban areas. It is this procedural difference which makes the
urban refugee category legally meaningful in the South, even
as the substance of the law takes no notice of whether some-
one lives in a rural or urban area.
In this chapter I explore the background and impact of
this anomaly, primarily through examples in Africa and the
Middle East. The rural-urban dichotomy in refugee status
determination (RSD) has no clear basis in international
law, cannot be explained by common assumptions about
international and regional refugee definitions, and likely
violates the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (Refugee Convention). Rather than in law, the rural-ur-
ban dichotomy has its origins in the different political uses
of the formal label “refugee” in the North and the South.
Whereas in Europe and North America, refugee recogni-
tion has been a means of granting asylum, in Africa it has
often been a means of separating refugees from their host
societies and transferring responsibility for their care onto
the international community.
The determination of refugee status tends to marginalize
urban refugees in the South in two related ways. First, it
subjects them to an arduous individual application process
in which many are refused protection, unlike their rural
counterparts. Second, it subjects them to a high-stakes
adjudication procedure that frequently lacks established
safeguards and is hence prone to error. Although many
urban refugees enjoy protection through formal status rec-
ognition, the risk of errant rejection of people in danger
creates a class of de facto refugees, who should be of concern
to refugee law and refugee policy, but in practice have no
legal recognition or protection.
The de facto urban refugee poses a number of problems
for refugee studies. It leads, first of all, to  a systematic
undercounting of  the urban refugee population. It also
points to a need for refugee studies to concern itself not just
with the substance of refugee definitions,1 but with policy
choices about how to implement these definitions. Often,
the mechanisms of implementation have done as much or
more to exclude people than the definitions themselves.
For policy makers, and for anyone concerned with refu-
gee protection, the de facto urban refugee raises immediate
concerns. A de facto refugee is at risk of de facto refoulement,
in which someone who should have been protected from
deportation instead may be forcibly returned to a country
where his or her life or freedom is in danger. Beyond this,
a de facto refugee will be denied the subsistence, integration,
and resettlement assistance that policy makers direct to-
ward recognized refugees. There is a need for governments
and UNHCR to reduce the rural-urban RSD dichotomy
and ensure that individual RSD is only conducted where
sufficient procedural safeguards are in place.
The Rural-Urban Dichotomy in Refugee Status
Determination
One Country, Two Procedures
In the substance of international refugee law, the category
“urban refugees” does not exist. In law, refugees are pro-
tected no matter where they live within a country; in terms
of a government’s obligations to respect refugee rights, refu-
gees in a city are no different than refugees in any other area.
The Refugee Convention actually prohibits any legal distinc-
tion between refugees depending on where they happen to
live. Article 26 provides: “Each Contracting State shall ac-
cord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose
their place of residence and to move freely within its territory
subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in
the same circumstances.” Recognition of refugee status
should have effect even beyond a country’s borders.2
UNHCR’s Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas states that
“UNHCR’s obligations in respect of international protec-
tion are not affected by either the location of the refugees or
the nature of the movement to that location.”3
That is the theory. In practice, in much of the geopolitical
South, it makes a great deal of difference for someone’s legal
situation whether a refugee lives in a rural or urban area.
The difference is not so much in the legal status per se, but
in the procedure by which a refugee gains recognition for
his or her status.
There are two main types of RSD procedures, individual
RSD and prima facie recognition. Individual RSD is where
each asylum seeker has his or her refugee claim adjudicated
through an intensive case-by-case process that usually in-
cludes interviewing, documentation, research, and decision
making based on application of the refugee definition. It is
through the individual adjudication of asylum claims, in
administrative tribunals and courts, that the law of refugee
status has developed in Western countries. Controversies
about the boundaries of refugee law – Are people who flee
genital mutilation refugees? Are people who flee militant
groups or criminal gangs refugees? Are people who flee
domestic violence refugees? – have been adjudicated
through this process. It is also through this process that
governments attempt to weed out asylum seekers they be-
lieve to be inventing refugee claims, through the process of
credibility assessment. Individual RSD, at least when con-
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ducted  in  keeping with international  standards,  is  time
consuming and resource demanding.
Prima facie protection is usually undertaken when lack
of resources coupled with large numbers of asylum seekers
from countries with known human rights problems makes
it impractical and to a large extent redundant to undertake
an intensive case-by-case process. UNHCR has explained
that what would be a manageable number of applications
in one country can be overwhelming in another:
[W]hat amounts to ‘large-scale’ or ‘mass influx’ will necessarily
differ from country to country and/or region to region, and
must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The analysis needs to
take into account the size and speed of the influx balanced
against the size and capacity of the receiving country to process
the cases in individual status determination systems.4
Where individuals within a group of asylum seekers are
likely to be refugees but the number of refugee applicants
makes it impractical to perform individual status determi-
nation, governments or UNHCR can opt to use prima facie
recognition to formally label a group of people refugees.5 In
such systems, all asylum seekers from particular countries
or territories are considered automatically to be refugees,
and receive legal protection in the country of asylum without
individual status determination.6
In much of Africa and in other regions as well, rural
refugees generally have their legal status recognized through
prima facie refugee status determination. Urban refugees, on
the other hand, generally have their status recognized
through individualized refugee status determination. Often,
two refugees of the same nationality, living in the same host
country, will find themselves subject to two very different
procedures. Both procedures are normal means of determin-
ing refugee status under international law. But there is little
on paper in international law that would anticipate two
parallel systems in different geographic regions within the
same country for the same nationality of asylum seekers.
Although established standards for prima facie recogni-
tion focus on numbers and capacity, these factors do not
explain the rural-urban dichotomy. For instance, Sudanese
and Somali refugees in Kenyan camps have received prima
facie recognition by UNHCR, which is responsible for RSD
in the country. If prima facie recognition in Kenya is justi-
fied by lack of capacity to process individual claims, it is
peculiar that UNHCR and the Kenyan government at the
same time undertook the burden of individual RSD by
UNHCR for Sudanese and Somali refugees in Nairobi while
they avoided this burden elsewhere in the country.
Similarly, numbers fail to explain differences in
UNHCR’s RSD systems in different countries. In 2000,
UNHCR reported that “some 4,500 Sudanese refugees ar-
rived in Kenya during the first part of the year.”7 These
Sudanese in Kenya were recognized on a prima facie basis
in Kakuma camp. But in the same year, Sudanese asylum
seekers arrived in Egypt (where they lived in a primarily
urban environment) at more than twice the Kenyan rate.8
If numbers and capacity were decisive, one would have
expected UNHCR to use prima facie recognition in Egypt
as well. Since UNHCR is responsible for RSD in both Egypt
and Kenya, it would be difficult to conclude that Egypt has
greater processing capacity than Kenya, where UNHCR is
also responsible for RSD.
Do Different Refugee Definitions Require Different
Procedures?
The prevalence of group-based status determination among
rural refugees is often associated with the broader refugee
definition established by the 1969 Organization of African
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa (African Convention).9 By this conven-
tion, African states extended refugee protection to people
fleeing generalized violence, a category not protected by the
Refugee Convention. The African Convention incorporates
the 1951 refugee definition, but extends it to more fully
include victims of violence, war, and civil strife.
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1951 Refugee Convention definition African Convention “extended” definition
[A refugee is a person who] owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.
A refugee is a person who] owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of  his country  of  origin or
nationality, is compelled  to leave his place  of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in an-
other place outside his country of origin or na-
tionality.
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Any person who falls under the 1951 definition also falls
within the African Convention since the African Convention
incorporates both definitions.
The fact that Africans adopted a broader refugee defini-
tion than the one crafted by the United Nations in 1951 and
used in Western asylum systems is sometimes cited as an
example of southern states opening their doors wider to
refugees than their northern counterparts. After all, many
African countries host far more refugees per capita than
Europeans or North Americans, and under much more dire
economic circumstances. It is often assumed that the ex-
tended definition in Africa was intended to compensate for
the Refugee Convention’s exclusion of refugees from civil
wars, which have been the main cause of refugee crises in
Africa.10 This assumption is correct, but it is in some ways
simplistic and not a convincing explanation for the differ-
ences in status determination procedure.
It is sometimes assumed that the Refugee Convention
definition is meant to be applied individually, while the
African Convention is intended for group situations.11 If
true, this would explain the widespread use of prima facie
recognition, rather than individual RSD, in rural Africa. A
related assumption is that urban refugees arrive individu-
ally, not in large groups, and hence are more like asylum
seekers in Europe or North America, necessitating an indi-
vidualized RSD process. Yet as an empirical matter, it is far
from clear that urban refugees have claims more likely to
fall under the Refugee Convention than the African Conven-
tion. Even if rural refugees tend to arrive in larger groups
than urban refugees (an assumption that I will not seek to
assess in this chapter), this would not necessarily mean that
one group is more likely to flee “persecution” as defined in
the Refugee Convention, while the other group is more likely
to flee disturbances to public order. Certainly, people flee-
ing the Rwandan genocide fled persecution of the gravest
kind, and they fled in very large numbers.
There is no basis in the texts of the Refugee and African
Conventions from which to conclude that the African Con-
vention is meant to be applied in group situations, while the
Refugee Convention is not. Neither convention specifies a
procedure by which its refugee definition should be ap-
plied. The African Convention’s definition is written in the
singular tense, without any reference to groups, just like the
Refugee Convention. Today, the African Convention is ap-
plied in individual status determination in some countries,
for instance in South Africa and Egypt. UNHCR assisted
refugees in Africa on a group basis before the African Con-
vention existed, and continues to use prima facie recogni-
tion outside Africa.12 For instance, in Yemen Somali
refugees are recognized on a prima facie basis, although
Yemen is party only to the Refugee Convention.13
Providing better protection specifically for civil war refu-
gees was not the only motivation for the extended African
definition. Civil war refugees are protected by the phrase
“events seriously disturbing public order in either part or
the whole of his country of origin.” Though this certainly
includes civil wars, it is much less specific terminology than
the other  categories in  the extended definition,  namely
“external aggression, occupation, [and] foreign domina-
tion.” Given that African states drafted the definition in the
late 1960s, African states were likely at least as concerned
with anti-colonial struggles (“foreign domination”) than
with the civil wars that predominate today. The original
draft for the extended definition was submitted by Egypt,14
which at the time was coping with the Israeli occupation of
the Sinai in the wake of the 1967 Middle East War (“external
aggression, occupation”).
Moreover, the Refugee Convention contains no exclusion
for civil wars. The definition requires that a person fear
“being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion.” The harms people fear in war – namely death or bodily
injury – are serious enough to be considered persecution.
Fleeing from civil war alone is not enough to meet the
Refugee Convention definition, but war-related violence
that is linked to one of the its five reasons can give rise to a
valid claim to refugee status.15 Since much violence in civil
wars is motivated by an intention to harm particular ethnic,
religious, or political groups, many war refugees can find
protection under the Refugee Convention.
It is true that some governments (for instance, the United
Kingdom16) have often resisted applying the Refugee Con-
vention in civil war cases, but others have not (for instance,
Canada17). Most importantly, UNHCR – which determines
refugee status in much of Africa – has stated:
there is nothing in the definition itself which would exclude its
application to persons caught up in civil war. . . . Many conflicts
take place against a political background which may involve
serious violations of human rights, including the targeting of
particular ethnic or religious groups.18
The UNHCR Executive Committee has expressed “deep
concern about the increasing use of war and violence as a
means to carry out persecutory policies against groups tar-
geted on account of their race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”19
The African Convention is important because it protects
random victims of war, while the Refugee Convention leaves
out people who flee generalized violence and are merely in
the wrong place at the wrong time. The African Convention,
by being broad and inclusive, also removes the ambiguity
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in the Refugee Convention’s more specific terminology
about persecution. But it is not correct to assume that the
Refugee Convention could not protect many of the refugees
in Africa, nor that the African Convention is necessarily
more appropriate in group situations.
What, then, explains the differences in refugee status
determination in Africa? The answer lies not in the legal
refugee definitions, but in the political and policy objectives
which have motivated governments in crafting and apply-
ing these definitions.
Why Recognize Refugee Status?
James Hathaway has argued that modern refugee law, as
embodied by the Refugee Convention, grew more from state
self-interest than from devotion to human rights or humani-
tarianism. He writes:
Current refugee law can be thought of as a compromise between
the sovereign prerogative of states to control immigration and
the reality of coerced movements of persons at risk. Its purpose
is not specifically to meet the needs of the refugees themselves
(as both the humanitarian and human rights paradigms would
suggest), but rather is to govern disruptions of regulated inter-
national migration in accordance with the interests of states.20
Hathaway argues that the resulting refugee policy in the
West under the Refugee Convention is a fragile system in
which only a minority of those in need of protection get it.
State self-interest is also critical to understanding how refu-
gee status has been defined and used in Africa.
It is often assumed that formal refugee recognition is a
means of granting someone asylum. In Europe and North
America, refugee status recognition has generally been a
doorway to inclusion in the host society, leading to perma-
nent residence and often citizenship. But what if refugee
recognition were not connected to granting long-term asy-
lum? Neither the Refugee Convention nor the African Con-
vention requires a state to grant permanent residence to
refugees. What if the purpose of refugee recognition were
to designate international responsibility for a person’s pro-
tection and care, while minimizing the demands on the host
country?
A  brief  examination  of  the  history  of RSD  in  Africa
indicates that African states have used refugee status for
different purposes than Northern states. In Africa, refugee
status has often been used to depoliticize protection, pre-
vent refugees’ integration, and defer responsibility for their
care to the international community. Whereas Northern
state self-interest leads governments to want to keep the
refugee definition narrow, so as to not lose control over
immigration, African states may actually prefer a broad
refugee definition because  it  allows them to shift more
burdens onto international agencies, and because it depoli-
ticizes the movements of large numbers of people.
Narrow window to inclusion: Refugee status in the North
In international law, refugee status is an exception to the
general rule that migrants can be forced to go back to their
own countries. International law since the mid-nineteenth
century has allowed states nearly unregulated authority to
exclude foreigners from their territories. Although in a col-
loquial sense the term “refugee” has existed since ancient
times, the need for a strict definition is a by-product of
modern immigration law. Modern refugee law came to be
after World War I as an exception to the general state power
to exclude aliens,21 developing around the same time that
countries like the U.S. were enacting their first comprehen-
sive restrictions on immigration. The principle of non-re-
foulement – the operative core of refugee law – states that the
authority to deport foreigners must be waived when it would
put someone’s life or freedom at risk. If governments were
not so intent on restricting migration in general, it would
not be nearly so important to strictly define refugee status.
This  system  in which  refugee  law  is an  exception to
general migration law makes it quite advantageous (from a
legal point of view) to be formally labelled a refugee. Having
a recognized refugee status allows migrants who would
otherwise be deported to stay where they are, work, enjoy
social security, and send their children to school. More than
this, Western governments have traditionally granted asy-
lum to refugees, entitling them to long-term residence and
often eventual citizenship.
During the Cold War, Western states saw political ad-
vantage in recognizing refugee status through the Refugee
Convention’s definition.22 The definition gave special
weight to protecting people motivated by pro-Western po-
litical ideology to flee the Eastern Bloc. At this time, the
West preferred to emphasize civil and political rights
(which the East often violated), while the pro-Soviet states
emphasized social and economic rights (on which it was
easier to fault the West). The Refugee Convention’s concept
of persecution facilitated the West’s condemnation of the
Soviet system because it had been accepted in the past by
the Soviet Union, and because the Refugee Convention for
the most part does not include protection from social and
economic violations.23
Nevertheless, refugee law’s existence as an exception to
general restrictions on migration puts refugee protection
under stress, and creates the need for refugee status determi-
nation. As the Cold War drew to a close, Western govern-
ments restricted access to asylum.24 Refugee status
determination became a particularly contested arena as focus
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shifted to asylum claims from the geopolitical South. Gov-
ernments began to grow concerned that migrants have a
built-in incentive to exploit the refugee system, since they
may not be able to avoid deportation any other way. Hence,
much of individual refugee status determination is devoted
to credibility assessment.25 Moreover, even where fraud is not
an issue, governments want to keep the refugee definition
narrowly defined so that it remains an exceptional measure.26
For this reason, a wide and rich jurisprudence has developed
around the law of refugee status, settling disputes about who
can enjoy refugee protection. Many categories of refugee
claims that are now generally accepted as within the interna-
tional refugee definition were initially resisted by Northern
governments – gender-based persecution and persecution by
rebel groups, for instance. Hence, in the North refugee status
has traditionally been a ticket to inclusion and integration,
while governments have used the status determination proc-
ess to keep limits on these rewards.
An open door to marginalization: Refugee status in Africa
In Africa, formal refugee status has often not carried the
advantages for  governments  that it offers in the  North.
Indeed, for a time African governments and UNHCR con-
cluded that the formal label could actually be detrimental.
The Refugee Convention’s stress on “persecution,” which was
appealing in the West during the Cold War, caused appre-
hension in Africa. Authorities instead favored vague hu-
manitarian doctrines over the 1951 refugee definition.
In Africa in the 1960s, governments allowed forced mi-
grants to remain in their territories and UNHCR provided
them assistance without anyone ever formally recognizing
most of them as refugees. Ivor Jackson has shown that in
eleven large-scale African forced migrations in the 1960s,
UNHCR avoided using the label “refugee,” even though
each group met the criteria of the legal definition and hence
qualified for protection under the UNHCR mandate.27 In-
stead, UNHCR opted to protect refugees through the doc-
trine of its “good offices,” and host governments allowed
the refugees to stay. Labelling the African migrants “refu-
gees” would have required acknowledging that persecution
was occurring in neighbouring states, a politically sensitive
matter given that many of these refugees were fleeing Euro-
pean colonial regimes. Rather than confront this political
minefield, UNHCR and host governments preferred to
offer refugee assistance through a more vague form of
humanitarian aid.28 Although they lacked the formal label,
these forced migrants received assistance in rural settle-
ments in an analogous manner to rural African refugees
today who are formally recognized.
Why did African governments and UNHCR abandon
this approach and begin formally labelling people refugees?
First, UNHCR in the late 1960s became dissatisfied with
providing assistance without legal protection. As Guy Loes-
cher explains in his history of UNHCR:
In the best circumstances, protection in Africa meant obtaining
access for refugees to local health care and education. The
[UNHCR] Legal Protection Division did not agree with this
viewpoint and was disappointed by the failure of some African
governments receiving UNHCR assistance to observe the legal
obligations they had incurred by ratifying the Refugee Conven-
tion. The Legal Division argued that legal status for refugees was
as important for the integration in host societies as material
assistance.29
Prior to this time, most refugees had legal protection only
through the UNHCR mandate because it was the only uni-
versal refugee definition in effect. Because the Refugee Con-
vention initially included only refugees who fled before 1951,
states themselves had not formally committed themselves to
protect new refugees. Legal protection of refugees was sub-
stantially strengthened by the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee
Convention, which removed this temporal restriction and
established that states had legal obligations to all refugees.
Hence, assisting refugees in Africa without formally recog-
nizing their refugee status became less legally justifiable.
Second, the political apprehension in Africa about the
1951 Refugee Convention’s focus on persecution was re-
solved by the 1969 African Convention. Its extended refugee
definition did not just broaden the refugee definition; it
depoliticized it. Under the extended definition, a govern-
ment can acknowledge that a foreigner is a refugee without
implicitly accusing another government of being persecu-
tory. A host government need only acknowledge that sig-
nificant disorder is occurring, without specifying who is to
blame. The African Convention includes several other de-
politicizing provisions absent from the Refugee Convention.
Article 2 provides that “The grant of asylum to refugees is
a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded
as an unfriendly act by any Member State.” Article 3 pro-
hibits refugees from engaging in “subversive activities
against any Member State of the OAU.”
Because of its depoliticized approach, some studies ob-
serve that African states often prefer the broader extended
definition, although in law African states apply the nar-
rower Refugee Convention’s definition as well. For instance,
a recent study of individual status determination in South
Africa found that South African authorities prefer to apply
the African  Convention’s  extended definition, and resist
individual refugee claims based solely on the Refugee Con-
vention definition.30 With these developments, African gov-
ernments were encouraged to embrace the formal label
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“refugee” for the same reasons they had originally shunned
it: to depoliticize refugee situations and shift responsibility
to a UN agency. Both definitions can be applied by UNHCR
as part of its mandate in Africa.31
In his examination of refugee policy in Sudan, Gaim
Kibreab demonstrates that the Sudanese government began
using the formal label “refugee” because it wanted to mar-
ginalize their existence within the country and shift respon-
sibility for their care onto UNHCR.32 The term “refugee”
first appeared in the Sudanese legal system in the late 1960s,
used in reference to a large group of Eritreans.33 Kibreab
argues that Sudan adopted this label to avoid the Eritreans
becoming integrated into Sudanese society by shifting re-
sponsibility for their care to international organizations,
especially UNHCR.34
Had UNHCR and the Sudanese government applied the
refugee label to all Eritreans in the country, no matter where
they were found, the intended marginalization would not
have occurred. Refugees could have moved out of the as-
signed settlements to other rural or urban areas, perhaps
finding employment among Sudanese people, while keep-
ing their legal status.35 To both shift responsibility to the
UN and prevent local integration, refugee legal status and
UNHCR assistance were limited to Eritreans who stayed in
rural settlements, away from Sudanese population centers.
As Kibreab describes, urban refugees in Sudan remained
in limbo for two more decades, until the late 1980s.36 Sudan
then established an “Individual Cases Unit” to determine
whether  urban refugees could retain the right to  live  in
Khartoum, and in effect prohibited most from doing so.37
Refugees could obtain a permit to stay only if they had
enrolled in a university, had a formal job offer, had family in
Khartoum, were referred to the city for medical reasons, or
were awaiting resettlement to a third country.38 Meeting the
legal refugee definition was not the determining factor. The
Sudan example hence illustrates that the shift to individual
status determination in urban settings often has little to do
with international refugee law, and a great deal to do with a
motivation to limit refugee integration. It should be noted
that the Sudanese policy of marginalizing refugees in con-
fined rural settlements largely failed to keep refugees out of
the city, but it continued nonetheless, managing at least to
ensure that most refugees in the city had no legal protection.39
In the present day, preference for rural refugee settle-
ment is reinforced by UNHCR policy. UNHCR’s Policy on
Refugees in Urban Areas makes clear that international
assistance to refugees will often be confined to rural settle-
ments:
UNHCR may limit the location where UNHCR assistance is
provided. Where refugees are assisted in settlements or camps
outside urban areas, UNHCR should provide assistance in ur-
ban areas to refugees from the same country of origin only with
the agreement of the government and if there are compelling
reasons to do to.40
Rural settlements provide a basis for lucrative assistance
operations, while urban refugees often raise more politically
sensitive questions of legal protection, since urban refugees
are (at least in terms of physical space and proximity to job
markets) more integrated into host societies. Hence, as
Zachary Lomo observed in a study of refugee policy in
Uganda, UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs often share the
dual objectives of transferring responsibility away from host
governments, and marginalizing refugees from their host
societies:
Generally, the UNHCR and international and local NGOs con-
dition their intervention on governments agreeing to settle
refugees in camps and settlements. Likewise, assistance to refu-
gees is contingent upon refugees agreeing to live in the settle-
ments. For example, in Kenya it was not initially the policy of
the Kenyan Government to restrict refugees to camps. Although
some refugees, for example, those from Uganda, were settled in
camps, this was not the general policy. But when the refugee
crisis increased and Kenya sought the intervention of the inter-
national community, the UNHCR conditioned its involvement
on the Kenyan Government’s allocation of land for refugees.
This signaled the opening of infamous camps like Kakuma and
Dada. Now, only refugees described as “vulnerable” are allowed
to remain in Kenya’s urban centers.41
Resettlement: The exception that proves the rule
Although refugee policy has in most respects marginalized
urban refugees, there is one area in which urban refugees
have a substantial advantage: resettlement. Throughout Af-
rica and the Middle East, individual RSD, especially the
procedures operated by UNHCR, is often tied directly or
indirectly into processing for resettlement to third countries.
Especially in the Middle East, resettlement is often the main
durable solution promoted by UNHCR, since local integra-
tion is blocked by government policy. Since nearly all reset-
tlement is to economically wealthy states (mainly the U.S.,
Canada, and Australia, and an assortment of European
countries), this offers a major reward for the refugees able
to make their way through the individual RSD system, and
it offers an incentive for others to try.
The pros and cons of resettlement are beyond the scope
of this article. From personal experience providing legal aid
to refugees in two Middle Eastern countries, it is safe to say
that many refugees want to be resettled, and often see it as
their only hope for basic security and a viable future for
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their families. Resettlement is not a legal right, and the few
countries that offer resettlement do so by rigid quotas. The
number of annual resettlement spaces (numbering in the
tens of thousands) pales in comparison to the number of
refugees in the world (numbering well over ten million).
The U.S. resettlement program, the largest in the world, has
an annual worldwide quota of seventy thousand, which in
2002 could have been more than filled by the Sudanese
refugees in Uganda’s Adjumani district alone. In this re-
spect, refugees who found themselves in places like Cairo
or Nairobi where there were realistic chances of being
resettled can consider themselves relatively lucky.
As with refugee law in general, there is nothing in
UNHCR or government resettlement policy that differen-
tiates between rural and urban refugees. UNHCR’s Reset-
tlement Handbook prioritizes resettlement cases based on
need, for instance in terms of personal security, medical
needs, special vulnerabilities (i.e. women at risk), and local
integration prospects. Rural refugees are in  some cases
resettled; some efforts have been made to open doors to
rural refugees, for instance through group submissions to
the U.S. resettlement program.
Yet much of resettlement processing is determined by
bureaucratic convenience rather than objective criteria. Re-
settlement cases are resource intensive, normally requiring
individual assessment by UNHCR, followed by individual
assessment by the resettlement government, followed by
security and medical checks. Refugees sometimes find
themselves in a state of limbo between these stages, not
knowing when, if ever, an initial approval will turn into an
actual visa and airplane ticket.42 Since it requires so much
administrative attention, resettlement processing tends to
take place in capital cities because that is where relevant
embassies and offices are located, regardless of where the
intended beneficiaries actually reside. A report on refugee
resettlement from Uganda illustrated the urban advantage
in resettlement processing:
The procedure for identifying refugees who are eligible for
resettlement relies heavily upon the involvement of UNHCR
Protection Officers and the Resettlement Officer. The country
office for UNHCR, located in Kampala, has one Senior Protec-
tion Officer, one Protection Officer, and one Resettlement Of-
ficer assigned to it, and an urban caseload of registered refugees
numbered in the hundreds. The north-western district of Arua,
for example, has one Protection Officer assigned to look over
the protection needs of 37,000 refugees located in two settle-
ments. Similarly, the UNHCR Field Offices located in the dis-
tricts of Adjumani in the north and Mbarara to the west, which
respectively serve 104,000 and 37,000 individuals, each have
one Protection Officer assigned to them. . . . [T]he distribution
of these officials vis-à-vis the location of refugees in Uganda
creates a de facto bias for refugees in Kampala.43
In a similar vein, a 1999 study by the U.S. Committee for
Refugees found that refugees eligible for resettlement in
former Soviet central Asian states suffered substantial hard-
ship accessing the U.S. resettlement program because the
U.S. processed cases only from Moscow.44
Even if many refugees seek it out, resettlement of urban
refugees can be a form of marginalization. Heavy reliance
on resettlement with urban refugees is consistent with gov-
ernment objectives of preventing integration and shifting
responsibility onto the international community. Resettle-
ment is in a sense the ultimate means of shifting responsi-
bility. In the Middle East, where non-Palestinian refugee
populations are primarily urban, using resettlement in lieu
of local integration has long been the hallmark of refugee
policy.
In Egypt, the most populous country in the Middle East,
non-Palestinian refugees have received protection and as-
sistance through a 1954 Memorandum of Understanding
between the government and UNHCR. Egypt agreed to
grant residence permits to “bona fide refugees, residing in
Egypt, who fall within the High Commissioner’s man-
date,”45 but only in exchange for UNHCR’s agreement to
determine their status and to seek resettlement in other
countries “in every possible measure, in the countries of
immigration, for the refugees residing in Egypt.”46 (This
arrangement was put into doubt after 2004 when UNHCR
began giving Sudanese refugees “temporary protection” on
a group basis rather than using individual RSD, a shift in
procedure that was linked to a tightening of standards for
resettlement referrals.) UNHCR has agreements with the
governments of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon that require
refugees to be resettled within a matter of months after their
arrival (which in practice is nearly impossible to achieve in
most cases). Refugee policy in these countries is a self-jus-
tifying cycle of shifting responsibility to the international
community by preventing local integration. Governments
refuse to allow refugees to work or obtain long-term resi-
dence, and often deny access to education or health care.
Since these restrictions prevent self-sufficiency, refugees
need to be resettled, and UNHCR promotes resettlement.
Host governments hence achieve their objective of shifting
responsibility for refugee protection to UNHCR and for-
eign  governments, and have little incentive to improve
conditions for refugees on their territory. Hence, transit
countries in the geopolitical South become dependent on
what Gervase Coles calls the “exile bias” in the refugee
policy, in which refugee protection depends on Northern
states granting long-term asylum to refugees.47 There is
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certainly no objection to making resettlement available for
refugees who want or need it. But in the Middle East and in
much of urban Africa, refugee policy is constructed so that
resettlement is in practice the only available solution for
most refugees.
In the long run, the urban bias in resettlement is likely
counterproductive both for governments and for refugees’
welfare. For governments trying to shift responsibility for
refugees onto the international community, resettlement is
a short-term measure because the promise of resettlement
may actually attract more asylum seekers. It could be specu-
lated that resettlement’s power as a pull factor may produce
a net increase in the size of urban refugee populations,
especially as resettlement opportunities have shrunk since
the September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. Although many
urban refugees benefit from resettlement, it fails to com-
pensate for their overall marginalization. Those who are
successfully resettled will usually remain in the city, often
destitute, for several years before travelling. Many if not
most asylum seekers will never be resettled. UNHCR only
considers resettlement for refugees whose claims it recog-
nizes. In many countries, it rejects most of the refugee
claims made.
Refugees recognized by UNHCR are sometimes deemed
ineligible for resettlement by UNHCR or cannot be ac-
cepted by resettlement governments. In particular,
UNHCR as a  policy avoids  promoting  resettlement for
most “irregular movers” who passed through third coun-
tries before registering refugee claims.48 Western govern-
ments refuse to accept polygamous refugee families.
Refugees recognized under the African Convention can have
difficulty resettling to Western countries which only apply
the Refugee Convention’s definition. Government policies
against local integration hit these refugees, as well as re-
jected asylum seekers, especially hard.
The Ways and Means of Status Determination
Importance of Fair Procedures
Whatever the reasons for conducting individual RSD, the
process can be fair and reliable so as to ensure that people in
danger of violence and human rights violations get protec-
tion. But the process is inherently difficult and high risk, and
it can be problematic if not conducted correctly. UNHCR
has advised: “The importance of [refugee status determina-
tion] procedures cannot be overemphasized. . . A wrong
decision might cost the person’s life or liberty.”49
RSD is rarely a simple exercise of applying a legal stand-
ard to a set of facts. Complete evidence is rarely available.
Finding the facts often requires applying the “benefit of the
doubt” to the testimony of the applicant. Assessing the
credibility of this  testimony  is shaded by  language  and
cultural barriers, variable levels of education, trauma, the
interviewing techniques used, the quality or lack of legal
advice, and fear of authority.50 Moreover, refugee status is
one of the few areas of legal adjudication in which the
decision maker must make an assessment of risks in the
future rather than of events in the past. Even after the facts
are determined, RSD often touches on areas of high politi-
cal sensitivity – immigration and political opposition to
asylum, gender relations, ethnicity, race, and religion, and
the politics of foreign governments.
In individual RSD, the only remedy for these challenges
is to apply standards of  fair adjudication. UNHCR has
called fair and efficient asylum procedures “essential” for
full application of the Refugee Convention.51 Through
UNHCR guidance and developments in international and
administrative law, the applicable standards of fairness in
RSD have been progressively developed over the past sev-
eral decades. The main procedural rights promoted by
UNHCR52 for asylum seekers include:
• Access to the RSD procedure
• Information about the RSD procedure
• An oral hearing with a qualified official (including an
adequate interview environment and competent in-
terviewing techniques)
• Access to qualified interpreters
• Access to legal counsel and advice
• Access to evidence considered (i.e. limited use of “se-
cret” evidence)
• Fair credibility assessment (which involves its own set
of standards)
• Fair and impartial decision making
• Written reasons for rejection
• Access to an independent appeal
• Special attention to the needs of especially vulnerable
refugees (i.e. trauma victims, vulnerable women, and
unaccompanied minors).
Such safeguards require substantial monetary, human, and
physical resources. In 2001, UNHCR advised government
legislatures:  “Parliamentarians can  promote  effectiveness
[of RSD] by allocating sufficient resources for refugee status
determination.”53
Risks of RSD Errors and the Creation of de Facto Refugees
When forced migrants in Europe or North American have
fallen outside the Refugee Convention’s refugee definition
but nevertheless cannot return home, scholars have called
them de facto refugees.54 Especially in Europe, these refugees
have often fled generalized violence. Despite being consid-
ered outside the criteria of the refugee definition, they have
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often been allowed to remain in countries of asylum in
various temporary or limbo statuses. These people are made
de facto refugees by the substance of refugee law. But, as
already established, the procedures of refugee law are just as
important as legal substance in understanding urban refugee
policy in the urban South. Just as the substantive limits of the
refugee definition can create de facto refugees, inadequate
procedures in applying the definition can have the same effect
by errantly  rejecting people who actually meet the legal
criteria.
In international law, a person with a fear of persecution
is a refugee as soon as he or she crosses an international
border. Refugee status determination recognizes refugees
as such, but it does not make people refugees.55 A state’s
obligation to not forcibly return a refugee applies to any
asylum seeker until his or her claim has been refused in a
fair determination process.56 If a RSD system lacks basic
fairness and hence fails to positively recognize an asylum
seeker with a genuine claim, he or she is nevertheless a
refugee. In theory, a de facto procedural refugee should have
rights under international refugee law. In practice, of
course, a wrongly rejected refugee will be denied refugee
protection. This is a concern wherever an asylum-seeker is
in danger of suffering an errant RSD rejection.
When an RSD system operates without procedural safe-
guards, it increases the risk of errant rejections, defined here
as any refusal of protection to a person who is in fact a
refugee within the legal definition. Errant rejection is a
greater concern to refugee policy than errant acceptance.57
A single errant rejection has immediate severe costs for the
individual concerned. Although widespread errant accep-
tance can erode public confidence in an asylum system, the
costs in an individual case are diffuse. The law of refugee
status hence provides applicants the benefit of the doubt in
order to compensate for the difficulty obtaining definitive
evidence.
There are no known studies systematically quantifying
the risks of wrong decisions inherent in various types of
RSD procedures, so the risk of errant rejections remains to
some extent conceptual.58 Different types of RSD error risks
can nevertheless be identified. RSD errors fall into two
broad categories: those resulting from decision-maker er-
rors, and those resulting from applicant errors.59 Decision-
maker errors are those in which all evidence that should
come to light has come to light, but the adjudicator never-
theless misinterprets the evidence (for instance, incorrectly
issuing a negative credibility assessment) or misapplies the
refugee definition (for instance, denying protection to
someone fearing persecution for reason of sexual orienta-
tion).
Applicant errors are those in which the applicant is
unable or unwilling to coherently produce all available facts
and evidence in order to allow the decision maker to make
the correct decision. This may occur because asylum seek-
ers misunderstand the process, fear  authority,  or make
costly decisions based on false advice. It may also occur
when trauma, language, educational, or other difficulties
prevent an asylum seeker from coherently explaining all of
his or her experiences.
Both types of error result in the same basic harm: a
person in danger of persecution is denied protection. One
of the important aspects of a fair RSD procedure is that it
seeks to combat applicant errors as well as decision-maker
errors. Take as an example a woman genuinely in danger of
domestic violence or genital mutilation in her country of
origin who submits instead a false claim of having been
targeted for political activities out of shame or because
members of her community give her misleading advice
about the RSD process. A decision maker would in a narrow
sense be correct to reject her on credibility grounds. Yet,
had she had access to legal counsel, she might have submit-
ted her genuine reasons for fear and have obtained protec-
tion from the very same decision maker.
At a policy level, applicant errors are as much a failure of
the system as decision-maker errors in that they are often
preventable by adequate procedural safeguards. This is why
the most recent UNHCR advice on RSD procedures places
significant emphasis on providing advice and information
to asylum seekers early in the process, with special attention
to vulnerable groups, and requires the provision of compe-
tent interpreters.60
Different procedural safeguards in RSD operate to pre-
vent these different types of RSD errors. The charts on the
opposite page illustrate.
Individual RSD in the Urban South
In dozens of countries, individual refugee status determina-
tion procedures lack complete implementation of estab-
lished procedural rights, generating a corresponding risk of
RSD error. This is true to some extent in the North, but it is
a particularly acute problem for urban refugees in the South.
The predominant systems for RSD for urban refugees in
the South are those operated by UNHCR. UNHCR per-
formed RSD in at least sixty countries in 2001, receiving
approximately 66,000 individual refugee claims.61 Until
recently, UNHCR RSD was generally ignored as refugee law
developed primarily through jurisprudence and scholar-
ship in Western countries. But UNHCR RSD has grown,
and in turn attracted more attention. The number of indi-
vidual RSD applications received by UNHCR offices world-
wide nearly doubled from 1997 to 2001.62 Studies
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conducted in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and East
Africa, both in academic fora and by human rights organi-
zations, have raised concerns about gaps between
UNHCR’s RSD procedures and established international
standards of fairness.63 From the beginning of the RSD
process, asylum seekers generally lack legal counsel and
information about the process. In some offices, for instance
in Beirut, UNHCR officials have challenged applicants’
rights to seek professional counselling in the preparation of
their refugee claims. UNHCR withholds from applicants
most of the evidence considered in their cases, including
transcripts of their interviews, medical reports based on
examinations of their bodies, testimony of other witnesses,
and country of origin information. Specific reasons for
rejection are usually not provided, and although there is an
opportunity to appeal, appeals are not decided by an insti-
tutionally independent body. Instead, appeals are consid-
ered by the same UNHCR offices that make first instance
rejections.
A number of other countries use mixed RSD systems in
which responsibility for interviewing, decision making, and
appeals is split between UNHCR and the government. Con-
cerns have been raised about procedures used  in  these
countries as well.64
It would be difficult on a systematic scale to actually
quantify the error rate that results from gaps in UNHCR’s
RSD procedures. But the gaps themselves, combined with
certain statistical anomalies, certainly provide reason for
concern and further inquiry. In terms of statistics, cause for
concern comes from the fact that some UNHCR field of-
fices sometimes post variable recognition rates, while oth-
ers post  noticeably low recognition rates. In  Cairo, the
annual UNHCR recognition rate fluctuated between 30 and
40 per cent from 1998 through 2000, then jumped to 42 per
cent in 2001, then fell to 24 per cent in the first half of 2002.
There was no apparent change in the demographics of the
asylum-seeker population to account for this, nor major
changes in the human rights conditions in Sudan and So-
malia, Egypt’s main refugee producing countries.65 A more
worrying trend appears in statistics from UNHCR’s Beirut
office, which mainly handled refugee claims from Iraq and
Sudan. From 1998 through 2002, the Beirut recognition
rate dropped from 42 per cent to less than 8 per cent.66 This
was quite striking given the notorious human rights records
in Iraq and Sudan at this time. In 2001, UNHCR-Beirut
recognized 24 per cent of Iraqi asylum seekers, while the
U.S. recognized 78 per cent and Australia 81 per cent.67 In
the same year, UNHCR-Beirut recognized 9 per cent of
Sudanese asylum seekers, while the U.S. recognized 68 per
cent.68
Without questioning UNHCR’s commitment to correctly
apply the refugee definition, UNHCR’s RSD procedures
must be considered high risk for errors. UNHCR RSD deci-
sion makers are likely to make decisions from unnecessarily
incomplete facts in a procedure in which mistakes are more
likely to go uncaught. Without legal aid and information, the
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Decision-maker errors
Error type Related safeguards
Incorrect understanding
or interpretation of the
evidence
• Oral hearing
• Impartial and competent decision
maker
• Right to applicant to review and
respond to evidence
• Allowing applicants to explain/
rebut negative credibility factors





• Impartial and competent decision
maker
• Independent appeal
• Providing reasons for rejection
• Legal representation
Applicant errors
Error type Related safeguards
Failure to provide all
information in the application
process (i.e. for fear of
authority, misunderstanding




Access to information and
advice about the process and
legal assistance
Sufficient interview and
hearing time (i.e. opportunity
for more than one
interview/hearing)
Applicant providing false
information despite a valid
refugee claim (i.e. resulting
from fear or misinformation
spread in migrant
communities).
Access to information and
advice about the process and
legal counsel
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risk increases that asylum seekers with valid refugee claims
will conceal key facts, fail to compile and explain all relevant
evidence, or be persuaded by ill-informed or disreputable
members of the community to submit false claims. Such risks
are likely  to be  highest for the least educated and most
traumatized refugees. Without access to the evidence consid-
ered in their cases, applicants cannot correct misunderstand-
ings, rebut negative inferences about the facts, or
cross-examine adverse evidence. Without reasons for rejec-
tion and without an independent appeal, factual and legal
mistakes are more difficult to correct. Gaps in UNHCR RSD
systems hence heighten the risks of both decision-maker
errors and applicant errors, with the end result that some
rejected asylum seekers are likely to in fact be bona fide
refugees. In general, UNHCR RSD procedures are likely to
create via errant rejections an unknown but significant
number of de facto refugees. This risk falls disproportionately
on urban refugees because (owing to the rural-urban dichot-
omy in RSD) they are more likely than rural refugees to be
put through the individual RSD process.
The Implications of de Facto Refugee Status
In this paper I have argued that choices about how to
conduct refugee status determination in the geopolitical
South have produced a rural-urban dichotomy that has no
basis in international law and which generally marginalizes
and disadvantages urban refugees. In order to obtain legal
recognition, urban refugees face a more arduous individu-
alized application process in which lack of procedural safe-
guards creates an unnecessary risk that they will be errantly
denied legal protection, even if they in fact meet the legal
criteria. As a result, urban refugee populations include for-
mally recognized refugees as well as de facto refugees.
These conclusions have important implications for both
scholars and policy makers.
Directions for Refugee Studies
If urban refugees are marginalized through status determi-
nation, what are the implications for refugee studies?
First, the mechanisms by which refugee definitions are
applied should be a topic for study and analysis as much as
the substance of the definitions. Any refugee definition will
only be as good at the procedures by which it is applied.
Second, refugee studies should include examination of
the lives of de facto refugees. A high RSD error rate will
create a class of de facto refugees, predominantly urban
rejected asylum seekers, who should be of concern to refu-
gee studies. These people are not counted in official statis-
tics, and in many cities no data is available about how many
rejected asylum seekers remain after failing to obtain legal
protection. This lack of data will lead to an undercounting
of the actual urban refugee population, and it will hinder
development of policies and programs to assist them. There
is hence a need for social science research to determine the
composition and nature of rejected asylum-seeker popula-
tions in the urban South. How many of these people may
actually be bona fide refugees? How do rejected urban asy-
lum seekers respond to their failure to obtain to legal rec-
ognition? Where do they go, how do they survive, and what
role do they play in host societies?
Third, refugee studies  should examine the impact  of
refugee status recognition as a social distinction, not just as
a legal label. Formal refugee status ideally should be a
recognition of pre-existing facts, but it also creates new
social realities. The social impact of refugee status recogni-
tion/refusal might be different where the RSD system is fair
and reliable than in cases where the RSD system has a high
rate of error. In the first case, the status recognition will
result from a pre-existing state of fearing persecution at
home. But if the RSD system is not reliable, refugee status
recognition may appear arbitrary and its social impact on
the refugee community may appear more pernicious. Two
asylum seekers who enter a host country in similar situ-
ations may suddenly find themselves in very different cir-
cumstances once their refugee claims are decided. A
recognized refugee becomes a relatively privileged person,
often eligible for UN assistance, residence permits, and
resettlement. These advantages will likely affect their posi-
tion in their own community, and may affect the social
structure of the community itself.
Fourth, the rural-urban dichotomy should be studied
more closely. Do urban asylum seekers fear different types
of persecution or violence than rural asylum seekers? Do
the differences in RSD and resettlement processing attract
more refugees to cities, or deter them? How do refugees
understand and make choices about these different proce-
dures and relative risks and opportunities?
Refugee Policy and the de Facto Refugee
The concept of a de facto refugee who was errantly refused
refugee status recognition owing to inadequate RSD proce-
dures poses a serious challenge to international refugee
protection policy. From legal protection to material assis-
tance to durable solutions, refugee policy depends on cor-
rectly identifying those people who fit the refugee definition.
To raise questions about the reliability of refugee status
determination procedures is  to question  the mechanical
foundation of the refugee protection regime. Yet, these are
critical questions if refugee policy is to respond to the real
challenges facing real refugees.
At worst, a de facto refugee can become subject to de facto
refoulement. When a de facto refugee, denied formal refugee
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status through a legal process, is deported, it will not appear
on paper to be a violation of international law. But the
human effect is the same: a person will be forced to go
somewhere where his or her life or freedom is in danger.
There are a number of possible strategies to avoid this
predicament.
Implementing procedural safeguards in all individual
RSD procedures would reduce the risk of RSD error.
UNHCR can take the lead in this by improving its own RSD
procedures, which are widespread throughout Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia.
More attention should be paid to using prima facie recog-
nition systems in order to avoid reliance on high-risk indi-
vidual procedures. International refugee conventions do not
require refugees be recognized on an individual basis. Inter-
national law requires only that no asylum seeker be deported
without access to an individualized procedure. Individual
RSD has been the presumed norm in Europe and North
America mainly because these countries have been intent on
excluding most migrants. Governments in fact have a wider
range of options to avoid individual procedures by protecting
groups of refugees without individual RSD. UNHCR guide-
lines allow for a country-by-country assessment of whether
there is adequate capacity to process individual claims fairly.
Individual RSD should never be conducted when procedural
safeguards cannot be implemented. When this capacity is
lacking, prima facie recognition is a better solution.
Eliminating the rural-urban dichotomy in status deter-
mination is essential to ensure that individual RSD is used
only where truly necessary. Since refugee law applies to
whole states, refugee status determination should be a na-
tionwide affair. Conditions in the country of origin should
be the primary factor in determining whether prima facie
recognition is called for.69 Decisions to engage in prima facie
recognition for certain nationalities of asylum seekers
should apply throughout a country. This does not preclude
adjusting social and economic services to different social
and economic needs in different regions. But dual systems
to recognize a refugee’s basic legal status have no basis in
international law, and operate to advantage or disadvantage
categories of people who should be treated equally. Elimi-
nating the rural-urban dichotomy also requires that reset-
tlement processing capacity expand in rural areas, so that
resettlement candidates are chosen by objective criteria,
rather than by access to administrative procedures. The
rural-urban dichotomy can also be reduced by conducting
individual RSD (where needed) in rural areas; just as there
is no barrier to prima facie in cities, there is no bar against
individual decision making in camps.
Could UNHCR avoid status determination dilemmas by
minimizing the importance of formal refugee status? This
could be accomplished by extending protection to people
in what UNHCR has referred to as “refugee-like situations.”
After  the  2003 Iraq war, UNHCR  issued a  preliminary
repatriation plan for Iraqis which included assistance to
Iraqis in Middle Eastern countries who had been refused
refugee protection (often by UNHCR offices) or who had
never applied for formal refugee status.70 By this plan,
UNHCR would prevent de facto refugees from falling
through the cracks. As of writing, the plan had yet to be
implemented because of continuing violence in Iraq. One
could ask, if people in “refugee-like situations” could be
considered within UNHCR’s mandate during a repatria-
tion, why should they have ever been left out in the first
place? Had UNHCR  applied prima  facie recognition  to
Iraqis in neighbouring countries, then most of these people
would not be considered to have a “refugee-like” status;
they would be recognized as refugees.
By casting a net wider than formal refugee status, the
preliminary Iraq plan had much in common with the “good
offices” doctrine used in Africa in the 1960s, and with the
effective expansion of UNHCR’s mandate in decades since.
Indeed, for UNHCR, rigid individual RSD has long been an
anomaly, since in many ways UNHCR’s mandate and op-
eration have expanded into humanitarian operations be-
yond the narrow legal criteria set in 1950s. As James
Hathaway puts it: “The essential criterion of refugee status
under UNHCR auspices has come to be simply the exist-
ence of human suffering consequent to forced migra-
tion.”71 UNHCR’s individual RSD work has been
exceptional because the agency which elsewhere acts be-
yond its legal mandate refuses status recognition when it is
not convinced that a person fits the narrow legal criteria.
Nevertheless, a certain amount of caution is required
before  rigid legal categories are abandoned. As govern-
ments increase migration restrictions and exclusion, legal
rigidity may be refugees’ only defense against forced return.
It is not surprising that UNHCR could plan to expand its
mandate in a repatriation program – which is consistent
with government objectives of turning away asylum seekers
and refugees – but in earlier years applied strict individual
status determination when it was trying to protect Iraqis
who could not return home.
None of these strategies addresses one of the core root
causes of the rural-urban dichotomy: the understandable
objective of governments in the developing world to share
the burdens of refugee protection and assistance. As has
been demonstrated, African governments began using refu-
gee status determination in order to solicit international aid
for refugee protection. Satisfying this government objective
is essential, as well as a subject far beyond the scope of this
article. But for the question of refugee status determination
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for urban refugees, there is an answer. Only recognized
refugees attract outside assistance. Unrecognized, un-
counted refugees are a burden that cannot be shared with
the international community. Host governments therefore
have an incentive to reduce the rural-urban dichotomy,
reducing the risk that an urban refugee will be a de facto
refugee. Refugees are already living in cities; formally rec-
ognizing their status would be a first step to discussing who
should take responsibility for them.
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